Abstract
Introduction
The climate and market risks have substantial impact on the performance of the crop industry. One way for farmers to reduce these risks is to purchase appropriate crop insurance products. There are numerous crop insurance products available in the market, so it is meaningful to study the optimal crop insurance selection strategy. In some regions, crop production is heavily dependent on climate conditions in El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phases characterized by sea surface temperature (SST, Nino 3.4 definition) anomalies in the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean (Cabrera et al., 2006) . The ENSO phenomenon is associated with climate variability from year to year in many parts of the world. When SST in the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean is higher than normal, the phenomenon is referred as El Niño; when it is lower than normal, the phenomenon is referred as La Niña. Neutral is the term for when neither El Niño nor La Niña are present in the Pacific. In the Southeast U.S.A., ENSO impacts are well documented (Ropelewski and Halpert, 1986; Rogers, 1988; Sittel, 1994; Green et al., 1997) . El Niño effects on climate are strongest in the southeastern USA during winter and spring, bringing more rainfall and cooler temperatures. La Niña brings warmer and drier winters (Green et al., 1997) . Recent advances in climate forecasting provide opportunities to improve the management of climate-associated risks in agriculture (Hansen et al., 1998) . Use of ENSO-based climate forecasts has been shown to help reduce risks faced by agricultural enterprises (Hansen, 2002; Jones et al., 2000) . Fraisse et al. (2005) and Cabrera et al. (2006) demonstrated the ability to use ENSO-based climate forecasts combined with crop growth models to aid the crop insurance industry.
Crop insurance is a major component of risk management that farmers could use together with climate information to optimize their risk-return characteristics (Changnon et al., 1999) .
Three main types of crop insurances are the Actual Production History (APH) or Multi-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI), the Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), and the Catastrophic Coverage (CAT).
APH assures a percentage of the farmers' historic yield. If the yield becomes lower than the insured percentage, the insurance pays an indemnity covering the difference between the insured percentage and the low yield. CRC assures income by indemnifying farmers based on historical yield and a pre-fixed market price, which is also called the price election. (This price is set by Federal Crop Insurance Corporation before the sales closing date for the crop.) If the actual yield multiplied by the actual market price is lower than an indemnified income level, farmers are entitled to an indemnity payment. CAT can be defined as an APH policy at 50% yield coverage with 55% price base election. 4 Only a few studies have explored the interactions between common crop insurance contracts and ENSO-based forecasts (Cabrera et al., 2006 (Cabrera et al., , 2007 Mjelde and Hill, 1999; Mjelde et al., 1996 , Letson et al., 2005 . Cabrera et al. (2007) and Letson et al., (2005) presented a systematic study to strategize the selection of crop insurance products under climate variability. They analyzed risks associated with each ENSO phase, based on long series of synthetic crop yields and independent synthetic commodity prices. They identified optimal planting dates and crop insurance products by maximizing the farmers' expected utility for different risk aversion levels.
The expected utility they considered is a power function of the initial wealth of farmers. In addition they used 5 plausible levels of risk aversion according to Hardaker et al. (1997) . It is usually difficult to evaluate the expected utility for three reasons. Firstly, the wealth of an economic enterprise is the sum of the initial wealth and the new gain, but it is not easy to assess the initial wealth. Secondly, the risk measure is introduced as a power function of wealth, which makes the model a complex stochastic non-linear optimization problem. Lastly, there are only 5 ranges for the risk aversion level, which is rather limited.
In this study, we optimize farmers' expected loss directly. The major difference between this study and Cabrera et al. (2006) is that we use a different risk measure called the Conditional Va lue-at-Risk (CVaR) (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000, 2002) , instead of the expected utility to model farmers' risk preference.
CVaR is defined using the α -percentile of a random variable. For a continuous random variableξ , itsα -percentile is the value ζ such that Pr
, where "Pr" is the probability function. For instance, for a standard Normal random variableξ , its 0. 
where E stands for the expectation. However, for discrete distributions, CVaR may not equal the conditional expectation; it equals theα -tail expectation (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2002) . Figure 1 shows a simple illustration of CVaR.
CVaR has some attractive properties over the expected utility. First, the risk aversion level is specified in simple monetary terms with some confidence level. (It's easy for farmers to decide their own levels of personal risks.) For example, the statement "90% CVaR must be less than $100" means the average loss of the worst 10% outcomes must be less than $100. Second, CVaR is a statistical characteristic depending upon the distribution of outcomes, so it can model risk aversion levels without the expected utility. Third, CVaR is very similar to Value-at-Risk (VaR), which is a standard measure used in various engineering applications (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2002) . Fourth, CVaR is a coherent measure of risk (defined by Artzner, et. al. 1999 ) with axiomatic-mathematical properties desirable for a "perfect risk measure". Fifth, Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) showed that CVaR of a discrete random variable is a convex piece-wise linear function that can be optimized with linear programming. Sixth, CVaR is more conservative than Va R due to the fact that CVaR ≥ Va R and that it measures outcomes in the tail (beyond VaR).
CVaR is an exceptional risk measure and it is gaining popularity in various applications, especially in finance (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2002) .
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The main goal of this study is to present a new decision making methodology by designing a model to help farmers buy crop insurance products according to realistic risk aversion levels included in the CVaR function. In addition to the optimal crop insurance selection, the model would help farmers to allocate land to different planting dates for the included crops. We test the model by applying to a cotton-peanut farm in Jackson County, Florida.
The Model
Assume a farmer can plant multiple types of crops on different planting dates, and that he or she can allocate arbitrary land area and choose different insurance policy for each crop. His or her task is to buy the appropriate crop insurance policies, decide on the best planting dates and allocate the appropriate area to each crop. In reality, the ENSO phase of the coming year is known to farmers before they make their decisions, so they can use the climate information to optimize the expected revenue sustaining their risk aversion level, i.e., the worst case loss.
Analyses were performed for all the three ENSO phases separately occurring during a period of 65 years (1939 to 2003) . The objective is to minimize the expected loss subject to a risk aversion constraint represented using CVaR. The number of scenarios is equal to the number of possible yields and market prices (historical data). The decision variables are the amount of land allocated to every planting date and the crop insurance products selected.
a. Notations
Assume the farm grows K types of crops and allocates area k q , k =1, 2,…, K for each crop. 
c. Objective
The objective is to minimize the expected losses (or equivalently, maximize the expected revenue). The cost per crop is composed of the production cost, the insurance premium cost and the operations cost. The total revenue includes the revenue from selling of the actual yield and that from the insurance indemnity, if received.
Z , be the difference between the insured yield and the true yield,
, thus the indemnity yield
The loss function equals 
is the decision vector and
is the random vector.
We minimize the expected cost:
, where " E " denotes the expectation of a random variable.
d. Constraints
The most significant constraint for this minimization problem is the risk aversion constraint measured using CVaR, which is the average of values exceeding α -percentile of a random variable. Since the loss function is a random variable depending on decision variables, the farmer can optimize the expected loss exceeding a certain value (α -percentile) by changing the values of the decision variables.
The farmer can control the expected loss exceeding VaR and assure that it is less than a certain threshold value v . This is modeled using CVaR as follows: 
Secondly, we assume the farmer could buy no more than one type of insurance policy for every crop. Binary variables k i, λ are used to represent this condition:
e. Complete model formulation
Putting all the conditions together, we express this optimization problem as:
Case Study
We use the same dataset as in the case study of Cabrera et al. (2006) . We optimize a 40 ha non-irrigated farm in Jackson County, Florida that allocates half of its land to cotton and half its land to peanut. For cotton, there are four planting dates: 16 April, 23 April, 1 May and 8 May. For peanut, there are nine planting dates, two dates in April, five dates in May and two dates in June.
These dates are set according to the current management practices in the southeastern U.S. Crop insurance products include the most popular contracts listed in Table 2 .
A farmer can choose either no insurance or one of three types of insurance products for each crop. Including the "no insurance" option, there are 5 options for peanut and 10 for cotton. The total possible selections of crop insurance combinations for cotton and peanut are 50. The price of the insurance premium depends on the type of the policy, coverage level, location and historical yield, which were estimated using the premium calculator from the Risk Management Agency (http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/premcalc/). We use 100% of the price election for APH and CRC crop insurance products as they are the most common choices of farmers.
Crops yields are simulated using the models available in the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT) v4.0 (Jones et al., 2003) . CROPGRO-Peanut (Boote et al., 1998 ) and the CROPGRO-Cotton are used. These models were calibrated and tested for management practices and environmental conditions in the southeastern U.S. Figure 2 shows the result of optimizing without distinguishing ENSO phases. Revenues for "all years" are lower than those from using ENSO-based information: this demonstrates the value of including the climate information. The optimal solution for "all years" is buying no insurance for cotton and 75%APH for peanut, coinciding with Neutral and El Niño years. One explanation for selecting no insurance for cotton might be that in our case cotton insurance is expensive while cotton yield is stable. Since the cotton insurance premium and yield vary spatially, it would be desirable to replicate the study for different locations. Figure 3 shows the distribution of revenues based on the best crop insurance selection for three ENSO phases. For example, the figure shows that the probabilities of getting $20,000
revenue are approximately 0.17, 0.06, and 0.14 during the Neutral, El Niño and La Niña years, respectively.
2) OPTIMAL PLANTING DATES 13
Only one optimal planting date is selected for each crop insurance contract and ENSO phase.
For peanut, the best planting dates are 22 May in El Niño year and 29 May in La Niña and Neutral years; for cotton, the best planting dates are 16 April in Neutral year, 1 May in La Niña year and 8 May in El Niño year.
3) RESULTS WITHOUT "NO INSURANCE" OPTION
Lenders and policy makers usually push farmers to buy at least one type of crop insurance.
If a farmer has to purchase at least one insurance product for both crops, the optimal insurance contract for cotton would change to 75% APH in all ENSO phases. The optimal planting dates remain the same.
b. Results with CVaR Constraint
If the farmer wants to control the average of the worst 5% outcomes while maximizing the expected total profit, he or she can add CVaR constraint with 95% limit to the optimization problem. The complete 95% CVaR model results for all ENSO phases are shown in Table 3 .
From Table 3 we can see that the expected revenue varies in accordance with the insurance product selections. Take La Niña years as an example, if the farmer requires that the average of his or her worst 5% loss is less than $10,624, he or she should purchase 65%APH for peanut and no insurance for cotton. But if the farmer wants to reduce the average of the worst 5% loss to between $9,559 and $10,624, he or she should choose 70%APH for peanut and no insurance for cotton. Finally, if the farmer is extremely risk aversion, i.e. he or she would like to keep the average of the worst 5% loss no more than $9,559. In this case 75%APH for peanut and no insurance for cotton would be the best selection. The "no insurance" option for cotton in Table 3 would be replaced by 75% APH if the farmer is required to buy at least one insurance contract per crop.
We compare the distribution of the revenues by those three insurance combinations (Non/APH65, Non/APH70 and Non/APH75) during La Niña years in Figure 4 . It shows that there is 0.27 probability of having $25,000 profit but a 0.07 probability of having $15,000 loss for Non/APH65 and Non/APH70. On average, the Non/APH65 and Non/APH70 selections have higher expected value and risk than the Non/APH75 combination.
c. Sensitivity Analysis
Since the input variables (yield, premium and the base price) for peanut and cotton are dependent on the simulations, we vary their values to see how the changes will impact the output.
We change their value by 5% and 10% respectively, for instance, we may increase the premium of APH70% for peanut by 5% and decrease the premium of APH75% for peanut by 5%. We observe that the model gives the same result for both the optimal planting date and the optimal insurance selection. Hence we conclude that our model is robust.
Conclusion
This research studied the impact of the accuracy of the ENSO phase forecasts and uncertain prices on crop insurance decisions. A stochastic model was created to select optimal crop insurance products for a certain year based on the ENSO phase forecast. Taking advantage of the ENSO-based climate forecasts, the model can identify optimal crop insurance products available in the crop insurance industry.
A case study in north Florida with a cotton/peanut farm was conducted. Results showed that the insurance choices vary under different ENSO phases and risk aversion levels. For a risk neutral farmer, buying no insurance for cotton and 75% APH for peanut is the optimal solution for Neutral and El Niño years, and buying no insurance for cotton and 65%APH for peanut is the optimal solution for a La Niña year. The insurance strategy for peanut in La Niña years changed to 70% APH for a risk averse farmer and to 75% APH for a highly risk averse farmer. These conclusions are based on the assumption that farmer can either buy no insurance or only one insurance product for each crop. If farmer is required to have at least one type of crop insurance for each crop, the best selection for cotton would be 75% APH. Since the yield and the premium cost vary spatially, it is desirable to replicate the study in different places to study how the insurance selections would change across space.
Results of this study are consistent with findings of Cabrera et al. (2006) . They found that the optimal policy is "no insurance" for cotton and 75% APH for peanut for all ENSO phases in a risk neutral case. Also, they found that it is optimal to have 70% APH for peanut during the El Niño and neutral years whereas 65% APH during La Niña years. However, they found CAT to be the next best option for cotton if farmer is required to have at least one insurance contract. 
